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It’s not uncommon to say that dementia destroys the person. We can see what is meant, but I suspect
that most of us don’t take such talk quite literally. We still go on caring for the person and loving
them; and death, when it comes, is still a shock. So plausibly the talk is hyperbole: as when we say
that it’s a diﬀerent person who comes out from some traumatic experience, the talk is meant to em-
pathize just how much they have changed, how shockingly diﬀerent things are now to how they once
were.
But many philosophers have taken the talk completely seriously. If we think, following Locke, that
memory provides the criterion of identity—that A and B are the same person if and only if there is a
chain of memories connecting them—then, since dementia centrally involves the loss of memory, the
person will quite literally be lost.
Michael Banner objects to such a picture. He points, amongst other things, to the social relations that
remain in place despite the damage that dementia brings, and suggests that identity can be maintained
by these even in the absence of memory. Many philosophers have also objected to applying the Lock-
ean account to dementia on other grounds, stressing the importance of other psychological character-
istics—one’s likes and dislikes, one’s values, one’s character broadly construed—and the importance of
the enduring body.1 
I agree with all this. After all, why should we think that there is a single thing that is important for
identity? Given the complex role it plays in our lives, isn’t it likely to be a complex thing, constituted
by many diﬀerent factors? I will return to Banner’s stress on the importance of social relationships at
the end. My main concern here though is to say a little more about memory. If memory isn’t the only
thing that matters for personal identity, perhaps it is one of the things that matters. And whether or
not that is true, the loss of memory that dementia brings can be devastating. Getting clearer on what
is involved in this loss can help a great deal in understanding what happens in dementia, and, more
practically, in understanding how we can maintain our relationships with those who have it. 
So, one way or another, memory matters. But the conception of memory that lies behind much of the
philosophical discussion fails to recognize what a complex phenomenon it is. Once we introduce
something more realistic, dementia starts to look rather diﬀerent. Even the proponent of the Lockean
view should hesitate before saying that it destroys identity.
The simplistic picture treats memory like a set of index cards, each bearing some fact. To lose one’s
memory is either to lose the ability to make new cards, or to lose those that one already has. The evo-
lution of the commonest forms of dementia (here I will be concerned mainly with Alzheimer’s Dis-
1. On the former, focussing on value, see Agnieszka Jaworska, ‘Respecting the margins of agency:
Alzheimer’s patients and the capacity to value’ Philosophy and Public Aﬀairs 28 (1997) pp. 105–38; on the
latter see the essays in J. Hughes, S. Louw, and S. Sabat, Dementia: Mind, Meaning, and the Person
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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ease, and Vascular and Lewy Body Dementias) can seem to confirm such a view. First the ability to
create new memories, that is, to move things from working memory to long term memory, is lost: peo-
ple will forget what they have just seen or done. Then the ability to recall what was once remembered
starts to go, typically working backwards, decade by decade, until finally the person is left with only a
few memories from childhood. And then even those go. It is easy to imagine the disease first stopping
the production new index cards, and then shredding the existing cards box by box.
But there are signs, even for the fairly casual observer that that can’t be quite right. For a start, there
are skills than involve memory that are not lost at the same rate. Learning to play the piano puts a
huge demand on memory, but famously some people can continue to play even when they show con-
siderable memory loss.2 Other procedural skills—the ability to use a knife and fork, for instance—can
persist for much longer. So a first distinction needs to be made between procedural memory, as dis-
played in these tasks, and other kinds of memory. Psychologists further divide the remaining kinds
into episodic memory, the memory one has for particular episodes, standardly those that have hap-
pened to oneself; and so-called semantic memory, which does, as one might expect, include knowledge
of the meanings of words, but also what we think of as general knowledge: the kind of thing that is
tested by asking for the date of the Battle of Hastings, or for the name of the Prime Minister. Clearly
the two can interact—one’s memory of some historical fact might be tied up with remembering wit-
nessing it—but the distinction is reasonably robust: one can, after all, remember that one started
school at a particular date, without being able to remember doing so. The evolution of dementia can
then be described as typically starting with damage to episodic memory, progressing to semantic
memory, and finally to procedural memory.3 So if the Lockean wants to hold that the loss of memory
in dementia brings the loss of personal identity, they will have to say which kind of these three kinds
of memory they have in mind; if it is all three, then personhood may well endure until the final stages
of the disease.
Still though we lack the distinctions we need, as reflection on another commonly observed phenome-
non will show. Whilst dementia’s overall eﬀects are cumulative, the progress is not straightforward.
Suﬀerers can fluctuate on a daily basis: up in the mornings, down as the day goes on. Or they can fluc-
tuate on a longer term basis: a bad week followed by much better one. Such fluctuations are most
common in Lewy body dementia, but it happens in Alzheimer’s and vascular dementia too. And there
are reports of suﬀerers showing occasional great lucidity.4 In such cases, memories apparently lost are
regained. How can that be possible if dementia destroys memory? Once it has ben destroyed it cannot
be brought back.
2. William Beatty et al. ‘Piano playing in Alzheimer's disease: Longitudinal study of a single case’
Neurocase 5 (1999), pp. 459–69. Note that the procedural memory involved isn’t simply a memory of
motor skills; the woman in this study could transfer the pieces to the xylophone, an instrument that
she hadn’t previously played.
3. On this progression see, for instance, J.R. Hodges et al.. ‘Semantic dementia: Progressive fluent
aphasia with temporal lobe atrophy’, Brain, 115 (1992), pp. 1783–1806.
4. H. Normann et al. ‘People with severe dementia exhibit episodes of lucidity’, Journal of Clinical
Nursing 15 (2006), pp. 1413–17.
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The answer comes in distinguishing between destruction of the memory itself, and disruption of ac-
cess to it. Keeping the index card analogy for now, the cards remain, but the filing system is destroyed.
There is very good evidence that, for Alzheimer’s at least, this is one of the main eﬀects. The evidence
comes from priming studies. Priming is a method which uses a prior stimulus to increase the speed
with which a subject responds to some later related thing. So, for instance, flashing the word ‘robin’
before a subject so fast that they cannot consciously see it, will make them considerably faster at
identifying a robin when shown a picture of one, or identifying the word ‘robin’ from amongst a list of
words. The prior subconscious stimulus ‘primes’ the subject’s cognitive system so that it is ready to
perform the task more quickly. Moreover, such a method can be used to show the working of subjects’
semantic memory: priming with the word ‘robin’ will make them faster at identifying the word ‘bird’.
Achieving a priming eﬀect like this shows that the subject has the semantic information to connect
‘bird’ and ‘robin’; in short, they can remember the connection. Crucially, this can show us whether the
eﬀects of dementia stem from damage to the semantic representations themselves, or whether they
stem from an inability to eﬀectively access those representations. Take a subject with dementia who is
now very slow at explicitly linking the terms ‘bird’ and ‘robin’. If the priming is just as eﬀective as in a
normal subject, then the problem lies in the ability to access the representations; if priming is no
longer eﬀective, it lies in damage to the representations.
There are forms of dementia for which semantic priming is not eﬀective: this is the case for those with
semantic dementia. But semantic dementia is rare, fewer than 2 of dementia cases. In contrast those
with moderate Alzheimer’s, who show a greatly reduced ability to perform explicit semantic tasks,
nevertheless maintain most of their susceptibility to priming. It seems very likely then that, at least in
cases of moderate Alzheimer’s, the problem is primarily one of access to memory, rather than the loss
of the memory itself.5
This explains how lucid moments can be possible: something can trigger access to a memory that is
not normally explicitly accessible, just as priming can trigger it. It has huge implications for those who
hold to a Lockean view of personal identity. For what is crucial to identity: the memories themselves,
or access to them? Presumably the former, since they wouldn’t want to think that people lose their
identity when they are asleep. But then, even in cases of fairly advanced Alzheimer’s, they should be
very careful in denying continued identity, since it remains very likely that the primary problem is still
that of access.
For those of us who reject the simple Lockean view, the consideration is equally important. For the
explicit asking of questions (‘Do you remember who I am?’) may be a terrible guide to the memories
that a person still has. It may be that access to them can be gained in other ways. According to carers’
reports, the lucid moments of residents in care home tend to occur when they are treated ‘as valuable
human beings’ and are prompted by activities like walking outside.6 Less dramatically, the simple act
of talking with a loved one may bring genuine familiarity, even if they are remain unable to explicitly
access their interlocutor’s name or their relationship to them. 
There is a further aspect to memory, which has been little explored in the context of dementia, but
which complicates the picture still more. Up till now we have been assuming the index card view. But
5. For the most comprehensive recent study see S. Rogers and R. Friedman ‘The underlying
mechanisms of semantic memory loss in Alzheimer’s disease and semantic dementia’ Neuropsychologia
46 (2008), pp. 12–21.
6. Normann, ‘Episodes of Lucidity’.
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that (or anything like it—snapshots, videos) is looking increasingly implausible, especially for episodic
memory. By using small triggers—showing people pictures, getting them to imagine things—it is
frighteningly easy to get them to ‘remember’ doing things they demonstratively didn’t do. It is still
highly controversial quite how memory is working here, but a plausible view is that rather than being
observed from some memory store, long-term episodic memories are constructed from the various
clues available (semantic memories, perception, emotional reactions etc.) in a way that makes for a co-
herent story. Our episodic memories are much more like interpretations than like raw data. And since
this then feeds back into our semantic memories for facts (we remember that she was there because
we remember seeing her there), these too are influenced by the process.7
What does this mean for our understanding of the memory loss that is involved in dementia? There
has been little explicit work addressing the question, but a few things stand out. First, the kind of con-
fabulation that occurs in dementia can seem very alien. These findings suggest that it is not; a creative
process akin to it is something we all do all the time. What is diﬀerent about dementia is not the
process, but the paucity of the cues upon which it is based. And even here, if what was said before is
right, we should be careful about concluding that those cues are lost. It may well be that the subject is
just finding it diﬃcult to access them explicitly, and there may be ways that they can be helped to find
them. Second, the question again arises for the Lockean: if loss of memory is supposed to signal loss
of self, which aspects of memory does this apply to? For if it is the process of memory construction,
this may be alive and well even in fairly advanced dementia. Third, if memory the construction of
memory works by the taking up of various cues, then it is far from clear that those cues have to be
generated from within the subject. Here we have a very concrete way in which those around can help
to keep memory going: not simply by reminding, with the rather passive overtones that that has, but
by contributing some of the materials from which memory is built.
This last point takes us back to one of Michael Banner’s concerns, so let me end there. The simple
Lockean perspective is apt to take personal identity as an intrinsic feature of the person: it is consti-
tuted by the internal psychological connections between them at diﬀerent times. But as the case of de-
mentia shows, even if we focus just on memory, the social will inevitably intrude. Keeping a personali-
ty going in dementia, demanding as that is, is a job for us all.
rjh221@cam.ac.uk
7. For an influential piece suggesting such an account see Martin A. Conway, ‘Memory and the self ’
Journal of Memory and Language 53 (2005) 594–628. For an engaging popular presentation see Charles
Fernyhough Pieces of Light: The New Science of Memory (London: Profile, 2012).
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